verdad y mentira de la muerte de Obama (2)
Truth and Lies of Obama’s death (2)
Bin Laden había tratado de llamar la atención al declarar la guerra a los Estados Unidos, en 1998 había formando el Frente Islámico Mundial para la Yihad contra los Cruzados y los Judios. Unas pocas organizaciones adhirieron ... nadie resultó dispuestos a sujetarse a la autoridad del saudí. ...encarando el peligro de extinción, Bin Laden ordenó una serie de ataques cada vez más audaces...
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La muerte de Osama es un regalo para el resurgimiento de Al Qaeda
escribe Praveen Swami
Diez años después del 9 / 11, el movimiento yihadista se presenta más fuerte que nunca.
"La Historia", escribió Abdullah Azzam, mentor de Osama bin Laden, "solo escribe sus líneas con sangre." Y agregó: "La Gloria sólo construye su noble edificio con calaveras, el honor y el respeto sólo se pueden establecer con sobre la base de lisiados y muertos. "
Osama bin Laden se convirtió en uno de esos cadáveres el lunes: pero aunque los norteamericanos y muchos otros, en todo el mundo, celebran la muerte de el hombre que fue la máxima representación del mal, hay pocas razones para el júbilo.
La cruda realidad es esta: una década después del 9 / 11, el movimiento yihadista es más fuerte que nunca. El pequeño grupo que bin Laden formó en Afganistán ha florecido.
El erudito C. Christine Fair ha señalado que Bin Laden, se ha convertido en una "especie de Che Guevara del movimiento yihadista": un icono importante no por el rol operativo que desempeñó, sino como una figura inspiradora que puede inflamar la imaginación de los jóvenes reclutas. Dicho de otra manera, la muerte de Bin Laden - o, para los fieles, su martirio - podría llegar a ser su último aporte a su causa macabra.
En 2001, cuando se le percibía en la cúspide de su poder, al-Qaeda tenía un núcleo de unos 200 cuadros – unos 120 agrupados en una unidad de élite operativo, y un pequeño número de soldados de infantería en actividades logísticas y de entrenamiento. Tal vez un millar de hombres se habían graduado en los campos de entrenamiento implementados en Afganistán, pero fueron divididos por disputas ideológicas y rencillas personales.
Años antes que ello, Bin Laden había tratado de convertirse en el principal líder del movimiento yihadista, mediante el desarrollo de alianzas laxas con organizaciones ideológicamente afines - alianzas que se construyeron en torno a relaciones personales, y se cementaron con dinero de sus arcas.
La ambición y el pragmatismo apuntalaron esta estrategia. En 1996, cuando la presión internacional empujó a Sudán a expulsar al líder yihadista, su seguidores eran sólo 30. Tenía dinero, pero había demostrado poco genio en la organización y no había construido un corpus doctrinal de pensamiento propio y singular.
Bin Laden había tratado de llamar la atención al declarar la guerra a los Estados Unidos y en 1998, había formando el Frente Islámico Mundial para la Yihad contra los Cruzados y los Judios. Unas pocas organizaciones firmaron la declaración, pero a excepción del yihadista egipcio, Ayman al-Zawahiri, ninguno resultó dispuestos a sujetarse a la autoridad del saudí.
Encarando el peligro de extinción, Bin Laden ordenó una serie de ataques cada vez más audaces. En 1998, la red Al-Qaeda bombardeó las embajadas de los Estados Unidos en Kenia y Tanzania. Pero todo fue insuficiente para lograr el status que anhelaba.
En Afganistán, el yihadistas libio, Ali Mohamed al-Fakheri, y Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, un saudí ahora en Guantánamo, trabaron sus intentos de ejercer poder sobre sus campos de entrenamiento. Mustafa Sett Maryam Nasar, sirio nacionalizado español, considerado por muchos como el más importante ideólogo islamista de su generación, también desconoció la autoridad de bin Laden.
Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal, yihadistas iraquí, más tarde abyectamente célebre bajo el seudónimo de Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, estaba dispuesto a utilizar los recursos de bin Laden para formar cuadros, pero no reconocía su autoridad.
En los preparativos para el 9 / 11, los esfuerzos de bin Laden para tomar el control de un grupo numeroso de combatientes extranjeros en Afganistán fueron rechazados por el Mullah de los talibanes Muhammad Omar, que dio el control al Movimiento Islámico de Uzbekistán - otro grupo que bin Laden había estado tratando de liderar.
Tal vez, paradójicamente, el 9 / 11 dió a Bin Laden lo que había sido incapaz de hacer por sí mismo: como los EE.UU. se vio envuelto en múltiples escenarios de conflicto, se volvió un enemigo común, la peste, para diversas organizaciones vinculadas por la ideología, pero hasta entonces abocadas a sus preocupaciones locales .
Parte del nuevo impulso provino de los líderes de al-Qaeda que habían huido a Irán después del 9 / 11, donde por un tiempo disfrutaron de cierta libertad para organizarse. El liderazgo de Al Qaeda en Irán desarrolló nuevos programas y estrategias ideológicas para cohesionar el movimiento yihadista dispar en una sola causa.
A U.S. PSYOP leaflet disseminated in Iraq shows al-Zarqawi caught in a rat trap.
Text: "This is your future, Zarqawi".
Zarqawi Jamaat Tawhid wal'Jihad estuvo sometido a la autoridad de Bin Laden, a pesar de que mandó un número significativamente mayor de comandos que los que bin Laden lideraba en su al-Qaeda.
Zarqawi, cuya organización cambió su nombre por el de al-Qaeda en Irak, también convenció al al-Jamaa'at al-Salafiyyatu lil'Dawati wal-Qitaal, u Organización Salafista para la Prédica y el Combate, de formar parte del paraguas de Al Qaeda, diseminando la organización en el norte de África. El al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico, según se supo, dio a la organización nuevos alcances - permitió lanzar ataques contundentes en varios países: de Malí a Nígeria y en Argelia.
Leah Farall, una antigua analista del contraterrorismo de Australia, una de los eruditos en Al-Qaeda, señala que “estas nuevas organizaciones, persiguieron agendas locales, pero tuvieron que recurrir obligatoriamente a “la franquicia Al-Qaeda” para llevar a cabo ataques contra intereses occidentales".
"Los líderes de los grupos se unieron a Al Qaeda", escribió Leah Farall en un artículo en la revista Foreign Policy, "había que estar dispuesto a presentar un frente unido, un único mensaje, y sujetarse a la autoridad de Al Qaeda – todo ello clave para demostrar el poder de la organización y atraer a otros a su causa. "
La causa se hizo bien conocida: Abdullah Azzam había escrito que el estado islámico que esperaba fundar "enviaría grupos de muyahidines a los estado infiel vecinos. Deberían presentar el Islam a los líderes y su nación. Si se niegan a aceptar el Islam, el jizya [un impuesto] se impondría sobre ellos y se convertirían en súbditos del Estado islámico. Si se negaban a esta segunda opción, el plan 3 era que la yihad dominara al Estado infiel. "
El nuevo al-Qaeda, que creció después de 9 / 11 encarnó la idea. Desde 2003, cuando Al-Qaeda estaba en la Península Arábiga hasta el ataque frustrado en el metro de Nueva York, los afiliados de la organización se volvieron cada vez más activos.
Los ataques importantes en los países occidentales, como el plan de 2009 del paquete bomba en un vuelo de Amsterdam a Detroit, o el ataque al vuelo de United Parcel Service, proveían de afiliados – aunque no eran unidades directamente a ordenes de bin Laden.
En 2010, el yihadista paquistaní, Muhammad Illyas Kashmiri, se unió a al-Qaeda, dándole un grupo formidable de cuadros y grandes recursos logísticos en el noroeste de Pakistán.
Los servicios de inteligencia occidentales creen que Muhammad Illyas Kashmiri estuvo involucrado en un ataque fallido al diario Jyllands Posten, que enfureció a muchos musulmanes con la publicación de caricaturas que fueron consideradas blasfemia, así como en los intentos de ataques de escuadrones suicidas en el oeste de Europa del otoño de 2010.
El 2010, Said al-Masri, un comando de Al Qaeda muerto durante un ataque con un avión no tripulado, dejó un mensaje póstumo llamado a "la juventud de nuestra nación musulmana a causar daños a los enemigos de Allah el Exaltado, los norteamericanos, en su propio suelo, y en cualquier sitio donde se les encuentre"
Esa es la tarea que el sucesor de bin Laden, ahora tiene...
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La cadena FOX le tiene ALERGIA a OBAMA ... y aprovechó para bromear ... anunció la muerte de OBAMA BIN LADEN ... o la de BARACK OSAMA????
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FOTO TRUCADA ...otra broma...¿o un psicosocial? ... nótese que todas y cada una de las partes del rostro son idénticas ... en la expresión de la boca la coincidencia es especialmente evidente ... para los más observadores ... todas y cada una de las hebras canas de la barba son idénticas ... ENTONCES: CERO CERO EN PHOTO SHOP !!!
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Osama's death a gift to resurgent al-Qaeda
by Praveen Swami
Ten years after 9/11, the jihadist movement it represented is stronger than ever before.
“History,” wrote Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, “does not write its lines except with blood.” He then added: “Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls; honour and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses.”
Osama bin Laden became one of those corpses on Monday: but even as America, and many others across the world, celebrate the killing of a man who more than any other came to represent evil, there is in fact little reason for jubilation.
The stark truth is this: a decade after 9/11, the jihadist movement is more powerful than at any time in the past. The small group bin Laden built in Afghanistan has flowered
Bin Laden himself, the scholar C. Christine Fair has noted, has emerged as a “kind of Che Guevara of the jihadist movement”: an icon important not for the operational role he played, but an inspirational figure who could figure the imaginations of young recruits. Put another way, bin Laden's death — or, to the faithful, martyrdom — might prove to be his last service for his macabre cause.
Back in 2001, at the perceived peak of its power, the al-Qaeda had a core of just under 200 cadre — 120-odd grouped together in a crack unit, and a small number of foot-soldiers handling logistical work and training. Perhaps a thousand men had graduated from the training camps it ran in Afghanistan, but they were riven by ideological disputation and personal feuds.
For years before them, bin Laden had sought to become the principal leader of the jihadist movement, by developing loose alliances with ideologically-affiliated organisations — alliances that were built around personal relationships, and cemented with cash from his coffers.
Both ambition and pragmatism underpinned this strategy. In 1996, when international pressure led Sudan to expel the jihadist leader, his following numbered just 30. He had cash, but he had demonstrated little organisational genius, nor had he authored a corpus of original doctrinal thought.
Bin Laden had sought to draw attention by declaring war against the United States and, in 1998, forming the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jews. More than a few organisations signed on to the declaration, but bar the Egyptian jihadist, Ayman al-Zawahiri, none proved willing to suborn themselves to the Saudi jihadist's authority.
Facing extinction, bin Laden ordered a series of increasingly audacious attacks. In 1998, the al-Qaeda bombed the United States' embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Even then, though, he did not acquire the status he craved.
In Afghanistan, the Libya-born jihadist, Ali Mohamed al-Fakheri, and Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, a Saudi national now held in Guantanamo Bay, stonewalled his attempts to exercise power over their training camps. Syria-born Spanish national Mustafa Sett Maryam Nasar, considered by many to be the foremost Islamist ideologue of his generation, also chose not to recognise bin Laden's authority.
Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal — the Iraqi jihadist who was later to become infamous under the pseudonym Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi — was willing to use bin Laden's resources to train cadre, but not to recognise his authority.
In the build-up to 9/11, bin Laden's efforts to take control of a large group of foreign fighters in Afghanistan were repulsed by the Taliban's Mullah Muhammad Omar himself, who gave it instead to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan — another group that bin Laden had been attempting to take charge of.
Perhaps paradoxically, 9/11 did for bin Laden what he had been unable to do for himself: as the U.S. became involved in multiple theatres of conflict, it emerged as a common enemy for organisations linked by ideology, but until then focussed on local concerns.
Part of the new push came from al-Qaeda leaders who had fled to Iran after 9/11, where for a time they enjoyed some freedom to organise. The al-Qaeda leadership in Iran developed new programmes and ideological strategies to weave together the disparate jihadist movement into a single cause.
Zarqawi's Jamaat Tawhid wal'Jihad thus submitted to the authority of bin Laden, even though it commanded significantly larger numbers of cadre than the al-Qaeda, suborned itself to bin Laden.
Zarqawi, whose organisation renamed itself the al-Qaeda in Iraq, also persuaded the al-Jamaa'at al-Salafiyyatu lil'Dawati wal-Qitaal, or the Salafist Organisation for Preaching and Combat, to become part of the al-Qaeda umbrella, giving the organisation new reach in North Africa. The al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as it became known, gave the organisation new reach — staging high-profile attacks in countries from Mali to Niger and Algeria.
Leah Farall, a former Australian counter-terrorism analyst who is among the preeminent scholars of al-Qaeda, notes that as these new organisations “pursued local agendas, the franchises were required to undertake some attacks against Western interests.”
“Leaders of groups joining al-Qaeda,” she wrote in a seminal article in the journal Foreign Policy, “had to be willing to present a united front, stay on message, and be seen to fall under al Qaeda's authority — all crucial for demonstrating the organization's power and attracting others to its cause.”
The cause itself had long been known: Abdullah Azzam had written that the Islamic state he hoped to found would “send out a group of mujahideen to their neighbouring infidel state. They should present Islam to the leader and his nation. If they refuse to accept Islam, jizyah [a tax] will be imposed upon them and they will become subjects of the Islamic state. If they refuse this second option, the third course of action is jihad to bring the infidel state under Islamic domination.”
The new al-Qaeda that grew up after 9/11 gave teeth to the idea. From 2003, when the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula first plotted an abortive attack on New York's subway system, the organisation's affiliates became increasingly active.
Major attacks on western nations, like the 2009 plot to bomb a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, or last year's nearly successful targeting of United Parcel Service flights, came from affiliates — not units directly under bin Laden's command.
In 2010, the Pakistani jihadist, Muhammad Illyas Kashmiri, joined the al-Qaeda, giving it a formidable pool of cadre and deep logistical resources in Pakistan's northwest.
Kashmiri is believed by western intelligence services to have been involved in an abortive attack on the Jyllands Posten, which incensed many Muslims by publishing cartoons purported to be blasphemous, as well as last autumn's attempted suicide-squad attacks in western Europe.
Last year, Said al-Masri, a top al-Qaeda operative killed in a drone strike, left a posthumous message calling on “the youth of our Muslim nation to inflict damage on the enemies of Allah the Exalted, the Americans, on their own soil, and wherever they are to be found.”
That is the task bin Laden's successor will now have.
This recent picture shows an alleged al-Qaeda member, second left, is being led from a building of the federal court to a helicopter in Karlsruhe, Germany. German officials said three suspected al-Qaeda members were working on making a shrapnel-laden bomb they could use in an attack on a crowded area such as a bus or bus stop. Photo: AP
Even though Zawahiri, as the al-Qaeda's deputy amir, will take charge of the organisation, intelligence officers believe that real power will lie with a younger generation of leaders — key among them a dark-eyed, olive skinned man whose name no one knows.
Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, also known as Ibrahim al-Madani, Omar al-Somali and Saif al-Adel — which means ‘the sword of justice' — is believed to have been picked to direct operations targeting the West.
Al-Adel wants to conduct a prolonged war of attrition, built around low-cost, low-risk operations. He hopes this will push western governments to retreat from Afghanistan, and to back away from brewing conflicts in north Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia.
In 1991-1992, he trained al-Qaeda jihadists at a camp near Khost in Afghanistan. Later he travelled to Khartoum, providing explosives training at bin Laden's Damazine Farm base. Mohammed Odeh, a jihadist jailed in the U.S., recalls al-Adel telling him that as the fighting in Afghanistan was winding down, it was time to “move the jihad to other parts of the world.”
Parts of al-Adel's thinking can be pieced together from a memoir he wrote in 2005. In 1987, the memoir records, al-Adel was a colonel in Egypt's special forces when he joined Zawahiri's group, the al-Jihad. Prosecutors said he had planned to drive a bomb-laden truck into Egypt's Parliament, and to crash an aircraft into the building — tactics that the al-Qaeda would later use to effect.
But al-Adel was less than impressed, holding them guilty of “over-enthusiasm that resulted in hasty action” which brought the wrath of the authorities before the al-Jihad was prepared.
Like other top al-Qaeda operatives, al-Adel was involved in planning the 9/11 attacks. In July 2001, however, al-Qaeda leaders were told the operation did not have the support of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's supreme leader. The U.S.'s official investigation of the 9/11 strikes, records Mullah Omar's dissent was endorsed by al-Adel and his associates Mahfouz al-Walid and Mustafa Uthman.
Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, al-Adel left for Iran. U.S. intelligence believes he masterminded several attacks on U.S. targets while based there. In response to U.S. pressure, Iran later detained al-Qaeda leaders operating from its soil. Al-Adel lived under house arrest near Tehran with his wife and children until April, when he was released in return for a kidnapped Iranian diplomat.
Last summer, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: “I assume somebody in government, from top to bottom, does know where bin Laden is. I'd like to know, too.” Now, she does — but the war against al-Qaeda is still very, very far from over.
(Praveen Swami is Diplomatic Editor of The Daily Telegraph, London.)
The Hindu : Opinion / Lead : Osama's death a gift to resurgent al ...3 May 2011 ... Osama bin Laden became one of those corpses on Monday: but even as America, ... alliances that were built around personal relationships, and cemented ... intelligence officers believe that real power will lie with a younger ... Keywords: Osama's death, al-Qaeda, war on terrror, jihadist movement ...www.thehindu.com › Opinion › Lead
Why isn't there any proof that Osama is really dead? - Yahoo! Answers30 respuestas - hace 14 horas Re-election!!!! say it is true that Osama is dead... why the hell is ... his head laying dead on the ground with some SEALS around the body. ...
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Obama Ushers in New Era with Death of Osama bin LadenPolitical ...2 May 2011 ... It's around noon here in NYC. The 2011… Read More ... His true significance lay in the fact that his reign of terror on this nation engendered in us a new kind of fear .... Obama's Full Address On Osama bin Laden's Death ...politic365.com/.../obama-ushers-in-new-era-with-death-of-osama-bin-laden/
Is That Him? Alleged Pictures Of Dead Osama Released | News One2 May 2011 ... This picture in my opinion lays to rest any doubt of the Osama bin Laden ... None of you offer understanding, empathy, optimism or true forgiveness. ... the CIA under protected OSAMA and put the military around him. ...newsone.com/nation/newsonestaff2/osama-dead-pictures/ - Estados Unidos
Osama bin Laden obituary | World news | The Guardian2 May 2011 ... Osama bin Laden: the Americans got him in the end in true John .... Simon Jenkins: Osama bin Laden is dead – but not al-Qaida or its cause ...
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-obituary
I have to ask, how do you feel about the Osama news ...17 entradas - 12 autores - Última entrada: hace 9 horas Once the mind and body have been awakened to their true potential ... Now I lay me down to sleep, one less terrorist this world does keep. ... He came in from PT this morning dancing around saying the bastard is finally dead! .... I am thankful that Osama is dead. I woke up this morning happy that I ...
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Is anyone morally culpable because of Osama's death? - Page 3 ... 7 entradas - 5 autores - Última entrada: 8 Oct 2010Is anyone morally culpable because of Osama's death? ... Catholic Answers reaches millions of people around the globe with the Good News of Jesus Christ, ... The true life facts of his life would have been devastating to the movement. ... These guys don't just lay their weapons down and give up. ...
forums.catholic.com › Forums › Apologetics › Moral Theology
Osama Bin Laden DEAD ? - Page 2 - Z8Games 9 entradas - 8 autores - Última entrada: hace 1 hora You feel so lonely and ragged,You lay there broken and naked, ... They have pictures of the "dead" Osama Bin Laden, ... I lol'd. Sad, but true. ... the whole middle east since things aren't going so well around here. ...
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Osama Bin Laden Dead: World Leaders Hail Al Qaeda Leader's Death ...2 May 2011 ... Fr. Peter-Michael Preble: Osama is Dead. Now What Should I Feel? .... And Obama says that is not true. I tend to believe our President! .... so how many duffle bags of cash did dubya lay out for his buddy "the general" ... Congratulations All Around: Politicians and Pundits Cheer bin Laden's Demise ...
www.huffingtonpost.com/.../osama-bin-laden-dead-world-leaders-react_n_856226.html
The Death of Osama bin Laden | News | English2 May 2011 ... 02-05-2011 Da Lay Myar (Myanmar). One go Two come. ... Let justice prevail,Osama has killed masses, around the world. 02-05-2011 jj ..... is dis true WHERE IZ DA BODY. 02-05-2011 afghan (afghanistan) ...
www.voanews.com/.../The-Death-of-Osama-bin-Laden-121069699.html
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verdad y mentira de la muerte de Obama (1)
mayo 2nd, 2011
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Osama bin Laden’s death is unlikely to herald the collapse of the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based branch, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is the network’s most active al Qaeda node and is operationally independent of al Qaeda Central. AQAP conducted two successful attacks on the United States since its January 2009 founding and, unlike other al Qaeda-linked plots, the operational planning for these attacks does not have links back into Pakistan’s tribal regions. The prolonged political upheaval in Yemen has already expanded the group’s operating space—Yemen’s counter-terrorism units were redeployed into the capital to protect the president’s interests and tracking of AQAP operatives’ movements has suffered.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Ready to Step In
May 2, 2011,
